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ApEAL---FEAuL QUESTION-ERROR TO STATE COURT-LI.BILITY ON IN-
jUNCTION BOND.-TuLLOCK v. MOLVANE, 22 Sup. Ct. 372.-Held, a claim of
immunity for attorney's fees as an element of damages under an injunction
bond given in a Federal court presents a Federal question for review on error
to the State court from the Supreme Court of the United States.
The validity of such a bond, the authority of the Federal court, and in
general the proceedings, decrees and orders of that court involve Federal
questions under Rev. Stat. Section 709. Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall.
I3O; Avery v. Popper, 179 U. S. 3o5;. Meyers v. Block, 12o U. S. 2o6. But
where none of these is questioned and only the liability of a surety under
the bond is to be decided, it is denied by three of the justices, in a strong
dissenting opinion, dat any Federal question is involved. They contend
that the bond is to be interpreted like any other contract; that liability under
it is purely a question of general law, and that the refusal of a State court to
accept the view of the Federal courts on the subject, expressed in former
decisions between other parties, is not reviewable by the Supreme Court of the
United States as denying an immunity claimed by virtue of "an authority
exercised under the United States." Rfev. Stat. Section 709; Provident, etc.,
Soc. v. Ford, II4 U. S. 635; Winona & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Plainview, 143
U. S. 371.
APPEAL-REvIEw-OBECTIONs NOT RAISED BELOw.-BRINCKERHOFF ET AL.
v. FARiAs Er AL., 63 N. E. 436 (N. Y.).-In an action tc procure the settlement
of plaintiffs' accounts as trustees, the defendant filed so~he general exceptions to
all that referee had decided, but did not object to the accounts as filed and
neither on the trial nor during the heaging before the referee made any spe-
cific objection thereto. Held, that an ojection raised by him specifically for
'the first time in the Court of Appeals on an appeal from the judgment will
not be considered.
This decision departs from the findings in Watts v. Waddle, 31 U. S.
(6 Pet.) 389; Campbell v. Stakes, 2 Wend. 137. It applies the rule set forth
in Markham v. Washburn (Com. P1.), i8 N. Y. Supp. 355; Dodge v. Cor-
telius, 168 N. Y. 242, which gives a definite limit to matter for review.
CA RiERs-NEGLiGENCE-DUTY TO ANNOUNCE STATIoNs.-HousToN & T.
C. R. R. v. GOODYEAR, 66 S. W. 862 (C. C. A.).-A railroad company, in
absence of statute, is not negligent as a matter of law in failing to announce
arrival of its trains at stations.
That trains must stop at the stations for a-reasonable length of time,
5 Am. & Eng. Ency. 565, and authorities in note; Teller v. N. Y. C. R. Co.,
2 A. A. Dec. (N. Y.) 48o. Company liable for any injury resulting from
violation of this duty. Washington, etc., R. Co. v. Harmon, 171 U. S. 571.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQuAL PRoTE CTIoN OF LAwS-STATUTES.--CN-
NOLLY ET AL. v. UNION SEWER PIPE Co., 22 Sup. Ct. 43I.-A discrimination in
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favor of agricultural products or live stock in the hands of the producer or
raiser, made by the Illinois Trust Act of 1893, exempting them from the pro-
visions which prohibit a recovery of the price of articles sold by any trust
or combination formed in restraint of trade in violation of that act, renders
the act repugnant to the 14th Amend., in respect to equal protection of laws.
Mr. Justice McKenna, dissenting.
Mr. Justice McKenna contends that no distinction can be taken between
cases in which a discriminate tax is imposed, and those in which conduct is
regulated or penalized. This view appears to be sustained by Railroad Co.
v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, and Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yar'ls Co.,
183 U. S. 79. But the weight of authority is contra. A discrimination found-
ed upon a reasonable distinction in principle is valid. Am. Sugar Refining
Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89; 2 Story on the Const., Section I96I. The Illi-
nois statute exempts a class from its operation, permitting them to combine
and do an act which, if done by others, would be a crime. Such a discrimi-
nation is purely arbitrary.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTRFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE-
LONG AND SHORT HAuL.-LoUIsvILLE & NASHVILLE R. Co. v. ENBANK, 22 Sup.
Ct. 277.-Ky. Const., Section 218 prohibits common carriers from charging
more for a shorter than for a longer haul. Held, that it is an unconstitutional
regulation of interstate commerce, so far as its provisions extend to a long
haul from a place outside of to one within the State, and a shorter haul be-
tween points on the same line and in the same direction, both of which are
within the State, as the carrier is thus compelled to adjust his interstate rates
with some reference to his rates within the State.
State regulation of local rates by reference to the existing interstate rate
in effect compels the carrier to raise the interstate to the level of the local rate,
which under existing competition would interfere with its interstate business.
The interference is direct, and though affecting only one carrier, is unconsti-
tutional. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Penn., 158 U. S. 431; Wabash, St. L.
& P. R. Co. v. Ill., 1I8 U. S. 557.
The dissenting justices maintain that State regulation of local rates
by reference to existing interstate rates as fixed by the carrier is no more a
regulation of the latter than if Congress had fixed the interstate rate, in which
case the local regulation by the State would be valid. Miller v. Swan, IO
U. S. 132. They also deny that the incidental effect of the provision in impair-
ing one carrier's interstate business, there being competing carriers between
the same points, is such a direct interference with interstate commerce as to
invalidate the provision.
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PERFORMANCE WITHIN ONE YEAR.-
McGnm v. CAMPBELL, 75 N. Y. Supp. 571.-Carpenters made an agreement
whereby the defendant sold his interest to the plaintiff, taking his notes
therefor, and agreed not to enter into a like business in the city until the last
note became payable, namely, twenty-seven months after April 2o, 1897. Held,
that the agreement was within the Statute of Frauds, requiring agreements
not to be performed within one year to be in writing.
The Massachusetts rule is that where the contract would be fully per-
formed by the death of a party during the year the stattute does not apply,
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and therefore it does not apply to a personal contract to refrain from certainacts for a specified time. Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208. And two dissenting
judges hold that the rule is the same in New York. McKinney v. McCloske,78 N. Y. 594-
Both the weight of authority in this country and in England supports
the majority decision. 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (xst Ed.) p. 688; Davey v.Shiinnon, 4 Exch. Div. 8r; Perkins v. Clay, 54 N. H. 518; Browne, Stat.
Frauds, Section 282 b.
CONVERSION-BREACH OF CONTRACT-RERGANIZATION OF RAILROAD.-IN-DUSTRIAL AND GENERAL TRUST, LIMITED, v. TOD ET AL., 63 N. E. 285 (N. Y.).-The bondholders of an insolvent railway company, pending foreclosure, con-ferred on a reorganization committee title to the bonds, for the purpose ofreorganizing the affairs of the railroad; gave them power for that purpose,and required the committee to adopt a plan of reorganization giving noticethereof. Held, that an action of conversion will not lie against members ofcommittee for using bonds to pay price of the railway company on a saleon foreclosure, without first making plan of reorganization and giving notice
thereof, such a failure being a breach of contract.
This decision is directly opposed to the findings in Cox v. Stokes, 156N. Y. 49r; United Water Works Co. v. Omaha Water Co., 164 N. Y. 41;Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522. It applies the principle set down in
Walter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 25o. The decision draws a sharp line between
conversion and breach of contract.
CoRPoRATINs-BuILDING ASSOCIATIONs-PAID-UP STOCK-PREFERRED CRED-ITORS.--CASHEN v. BUJilNG AND LOAN ASSOCIATION ET AL., 41 S. E. 51 (Ga.).-Plaintiff had purchased some full paid "stock" of the defendant association
with the agreement that he was to receive regular rate of interest and was
not to share in the profits or losses of the association. Held, on the failureof the association, that the above agreement established a relation of debtor andcreditor between the parties, and that plaintiff's claim was entitled to preced-
ence over that of other stockholders.
Very few cases involving this point have ever been decided. In someStates the issuance of such non-participating stock is prohibited. State v.
Oberlin Asso., 35 0. St. 258; Stiles' Appeal, 95 Pa. St. 122. In the following
cases it has been held that the holders of such stock are on no different foot-ing as creditors from the holders of the ordinary stock. Leahy v. Asso., 76N. W. 625 (Minn.); Hohenshell v. Asso., 41 S. W. 948 (Mo.). The court
relied upon the authority of Cook v. Asso., 1o4 Ga. 814.
CORPORATIONS--CoNsoLiDATIoN-DEBTS OF MERGED COMPANIES-PAYMENT.
-SrADFoaD v. DETRoT Y. & A. A. Ry. Co., 89 N. W. 96o (Mich.).-Plaintiff
had secured a judgment against one of the merged companies of the defend-
ant corporation subsequent to the consolidation. Held, that the consolidated
corporation was liable for the debt, although the merged company was insol-
vent at time of merger.
This case is an important one, and it declares that the law will not per-mit the creditors of two corporations to be deprived of the assets of such
corporations in payment of their debts and turn them over to suits in equityagainst the stockholders when the union with another corporation is effected
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without the passing of a valuable consideration between the corporations them-
selves. See Chicago S. F. R. Co. v. Ashling, 56 Ill. App. 327; State V. B. .5"
L. R. Co., 77 Md. 489. Nor can a corporation set up in defence the illegality
of its own organization. Such illegality can only be attacked in a direct pro-
ceeding. Meth. Ep. Church v. Pickett, ig N. Y. 485; Swartout v. Mich. Air
Line R. Co., 24 Mich. 388. Contra, Carey v. Cincinnati R. R. Co., 5 Clarke
3o6.
DECEIT-SALE OF SHAxs-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-DRAKE ET AL. V. HOL-
BROOK, 66 S. W. 512 (Ky.).-Plaintiff was induced through deceit of c&efend-
ant to buy certain shares of stock, the value of which was much less than
represented. Held, the measure of damages was the difference between the
actual and represented value of the stock. Du Relle, Burnam and O'Rear,
3. 3., dissenting.
The majority held that the party using deceit must make good his repre-
sentatjons. If plaintiff was induced to believe he was getting a bargain he is
entitled to same-the profit actually represented. Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d
Ed.) 184. Bank v. Gaitskill, 37 S. W. i6o; Trimble v. Ward, 97 Ky. 748.
The minority follow the opinion of Chief Justice Fuller in Smith z.
Bolles, 132 U. S. 125. The measure of damages is what the plaintiff "lost by
being deceived into the purchase," and must "not include the expected fruits
of an unrealized speculation." The plaintiff should recover only what will
repair his injury. Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211; Walker v. Smith, Fed. Cas.
No. I7,086.
ELEVATED RAILROADS-DAMAGE TO ABUTTING PROPERTY-CONSTRUCTION OF
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION.-ALDRICH V. METROPOLITAN W. E. EL. RY. Co. (ILL.),
63 N. E. i55.-Defendant's road, which is constructed on its own land
except where it crosses streets under license from the city, passes within
thirty-one feet of plaintiff's expensive apartment house, obstructing the view
and passage to the premises, and the noise destroying peace and quiet. Held,
not to be a taking of or damage to such private property for public use,
within the meaning of Const. Art. 2, Sec. 13, which prohibits such tak-
ing without just compensation.
The constitutional provision of i87O was not intended to give a remedy
for all incidental losses nor for the depreciation of property caused by the
construction of railroads in the vicinity, but was intended only to restore a
remedy which existed at common law but which had been denied by legisla-
tion and the Constitution of 1848. In order to recover under this provision,
there must have been some physical disturbance, with a right connected
with property. Rigney v. City of Chicago, lO2 Ill. 64. Had the railroad
passed directly in front of plaintiff's lot impairing his means of ingress a
different rule would have been. applied. Railroad Co. v. Leah, 152 Ill. 249,
or if the elevated road had been a steam road, and cinders, ashes and smoke
had been thrown and blown into the plaintiff's premises. Railroad Co. v.
Darke, 148 Ill. 226.
EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS--SuPPLEMENTING WRITING BY PAROL.-
HERD V. STATE, 67 S. W. 495 (Tex.).-Held, that dying declarations reduced
to writing and signed may be supplemented by other declarations made at the
same time, and not reduced to writing. Henderson, J., dissenting.
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This is in direct contradiction to wen recognized principles of evidence,
and can only be explained in light of the modern tendency to admit all evi-
dence more freely. Wharton on Horn., Sec. 766; Greenif. on Ev., Sec. 161.
In the early English case of Rex. v. Reason, I Strange 499, it was held that
even prior and subsequent declarations, made the same day as the written one,
were inadmissible.
FALSE IMPRISbNMENT-ARREST BY ORDER OF STATE COURT AFTER Dis-
CHARGE IN BANKRUPTcY-RELEASE ON HABEAS CORPUS AS EVIDENCE OF UN-
LAWFUL ARREST.-BENNETT V. LEWIS ET AL., 66 S. W. 525 (Ky.).-Plaintiff to
avoid arrest by defendant secured from referee in bankruptcy an order ot
immunity from arrest on all his debts. He was thereafter maliciously arrested
and imprisoned on a judgment of State court rendered prior to his discharge
in bankruptcy. Held, arrest not unlawful. Divided court.
As a discharge in bankruptcy does not release from all debts, plaintiff
should have pleaded his discharge from the debt in question. The fact that
his arrest was decided to be illegal by U. S. District Court on habeas corpus
shows only that he was discharged from custody, and State court might pro-
ceed with its process until the bankruptcy proceeding was properly pleaded.
The dissenting judges strongly contend that such arrest was in defiance
of the Federal court; that it was unnecessary to enumerate the 'debts from
which he had been discharged as defendant knew he had been released from
debt in question. To uphold such an arrest is to disregard judgments of U. S.
courts in matters within their undoubted jurisdiction.
INSOLVENCY-EFFECT OF GENERAL ASSIGNMENT.-IN RE HAYES, 75 N. Y.
Supp. 312.-A general assignment by a member of the New York Stock
Exchange does not affect the contractual rights which members of the ex-
change have in the membership, so that dividends paid them as creditors
out of the sale of the insolvent member's membership are not to be deducted
in determining the amount for which they are entitled to dividends out of
the assigned estate.
The late case of Merrill v. Bank, 173 U. S. 131, in which three justices
very emphatically dissented, has left this point of law in an unsatisfactory
state. In this case the court, following Merrill v. Bank, supra, concludes
that the claim of the creditor to share in the assets of the debtor and his
debt against the debtor, are distinct and separate rights. The court has
ably attempted to reconcile the authorities, and the case should be of value
in future controversies.
JOINT CAUSES OF AcoN--CoNsmucTIoN OF WILL-HUGHES ET AL. V.
HUGHES ET AL., 63 N. E. 250 (Ind.).-Held, that an executrix could not join
in her fiduciary and individual capacity for the purpose of demanding the
construction of a will. Wiley, J., dissenting.
The tendency of the law being to discourage multiplicity of suits, such
joinder has generally been upheld. Thus, it was allowed for the purpose
of collecting rent in Armstrong v. Hall, 17 How. Prac. 76, and where an exec-
utor was made defendant in an action for debt, Day v. Stone, 15 Abb. Prac.
(N. S.) 137. The prevailing opinion is based on the rule that it is not
enough that there be a common interest in the cause of action, but that there
must be a common interest in the relief sought. Martin v. Davis, 82 Ind. 41.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANCES-SCATTERING PAPzR-DiscRIml-
NATION.-CITY OF PHILADELPHIA V. BROBENDER, 51 AtI. 374 (Pa.) The muni-
cipal council of Philadelphia passed an ordinance prohibiting the casting of
advertisements or hand bills not enclosed in envelopes and addressed (news-
papers are excepted) into the vestibules, yards or on the porches of dwellings.
Held, this is a proper exercise of the police power and does not discriminate
against a class.
There is no class discrimination, unless those engaged in the same busi-
ness are affected differently, Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703. It was
decided that a city ordinance might cover a private nuisance where it was
incidental to a public nuisance even if it were not a common nuisance per se.
NEW TRIAL-PERsONAL INJURIES-CONDUCT OF PLAINTn F.-McGLOIN V.
METROPOLITAN ST. Ry., 75 N. Y. Supp. 593.-On the first day of a trial for per-
sonal injuries, after adjournment and in the presence of jurors, plaintiff be-
came prostrated in the court room, was attended by physicians and after about
twenty minutes removed from the room. There was evidence that his phy-
sical condition at the trial was the result of the injuries alleged. It was not
alleged that the attack was simulated or purposely manifested before the
jury, and in response to inquiry by the court, the jurors intimated that the
occurrence would not affect their decision. Held, that the court's refusal to
grant a new trial would not be disturbed.
Two judges dissent on the ground that what had occurred must inev-
itably have influenced the jury, and that it was practically testimony as to
his alleged injuries the truth of which the defendant had no opportunity
to question and therefore there was no fair trial in this respect. Their position
would have been correct if there had been the least evidence of intentional
misconduct by the plaintiff. 12 Enc. P. & Pr. 615.
R E OVAL OF CAUSES-SuFFICIENCY OF PETITIoN-FoREIGN CORPORATIONS.
-THOMPSON V. SOUTHERN R. R., 41 S. E. 9 (N. C.).-Defendant tried to have
the case removed from the State to the Federal court, alleging that it was
a citizen of another State than that in which suit was brought and in which
plaintiff lived. Held, that this allegation was insufficient as it did not state
specifically that defendant was not a resident of the State in which suit was
brought.
The reason for this decision was that the corporation might be a citizen
both of a foreign State and of that in which suit was brought. The rule
seems to be that all jurisdictional facts must be stated in the clearest possible
manner. Hirschl v. Machine Co., 42 Fed. 8o3; Fife v. Whittell, io2 Fed. 537.
It has been held in other cases, however, that a mere allegation that the cor-
poration is a citizen of another State is sufficient, as this precludes the idea
of it being a citizen of the State where suit is brought. Myers v. Murray,
42 Fed. 695; Shattuck v. Insurance Co., 7 C. C. A. 386.
STREET RAILwAYs-ELECTRIc-ADDITIoNAL BURDEN TO ABUTTING PROPERTY
OWNERS.-PECK ET AL. V. SCHENECTADY R. R. Co., 63 N. FR 357 (N. Y.).-
Held, that the use of a city street by an electric road is an additional burden
to the owners of the fee, for which they are entitled to compensation. Parker,
C. J., and Werner, J., dissenting.
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This decision which follows Craig v. Railroad Co., 39 N. Y. 404, is con-
trary to the numerous holdings in all the other States of the country. Barney
v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Attorney General v. Railroad Co., 125 Mass. 515;
Elliott v. Railroad Co., 32 Conn. 579. The dissenting opinion is a vigorous
protest against carrying conformity of decision so far, especially in the
face of present conditions, street railways now being so common and conven-
ient to the public as to come within the purposes for which streets are
established and maintained. I Lewis, Em. Dom. (2d Ed.) sec. 1I5f.
TARIlF-IMPoRTATION FROM PHILIPPINES-SENATE RESOLUTION EXPLAIN-
ING INTENT IN RATIFYING TREATY-EFFECT OF CONDITION OF WAR.-THE
DIAMOND RINGS, 22 Sup. Ct. 59.-Held, that a condition, of war in the Phil-
ippines and a Senate resolution to effect that in ratifying the Spanish treaty
the Senate did not intend to permanently annex islands nor incorporate their
inhabitants into citizenship, did not operate to differentiate the status of the
Philippines from that of Porto Rico in regard to tariff laws. Gray, Shiras,
White, McKenna, J. J., dissenting.
In De Lima v. Bidwell, 21 Sup. Ct. 743, Porto Rico, after cession is de-
clared United States territory and not subject to tariff laws applicable to
foreign countries. Downs v. Bidwell, 21 Sup. Ct. sustained an act of Con-
gress making discrimination in the case of Porto Rico in duties, imports and
excises contrary to the constitutional provision. The court here approves
both decisions and holds that in the absence of a special act of Congress it
would be mere judicial legislation to make the existing tariff laws applicable
to imports from the Philippines.
TAXES-INHERITANCE-PERsONAL PROPERTY OF NoN-RESIDENT ALIEN-
WILL ExEcuTED ABROAD.-EmMAN v. MARTINEZ, 22 Sup. Ct. 5I.-Held,
American securities passing under will executed abroad are not subject to
inheritance tax imposed by Act of 1898, Section 29.
The question revolves upon the phrase "passed by will or under intestate
laws of any State or territory." This language has frequently created diffi-
culty in State courts. Ronaine's Estate, 127 N. Y. 89. The words quoted
above must be construed together and to construe "State" to include a foreign
State would be rejecting a recognized principle that tax-laws should be
literally construed. Am. Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468;
U. S. v. Hunnewell, 13 Fed. 67.
TRUSTS-DUTIES AND LIALrriEs OF TRUSTEEs-GuARDIAN'S SALE-CoN-
FIRmATION.-FRAzIER V. JEAKINS, 68 Pac. 24 (Kan.).-A sale of the property
of a minor by the guardian to her husband is void even though such sale was
made upon fair consideration and free from fraud, and received the confirma-
tion of a court of probate. Cunningham, J., dissenting.
"We cannot doubt that a sale by a trustee to his own wife would be set
aside on the application of the cestui que trust on the ground of her relation-
ship to the trustee. It would be evidence of unfairness quite as much as if
the sale were made to the trustee himself, and falls within the spirit of the
rule which forbids his own purchase." Appeal of Dundas, 64 Pac. 325. The
confirmation of a guardian's sale by a court of probate is res judicata as to
irregularities only, and cures nothing of substance. Koehler v. Ball, 2 Kan.
i6I, 83 Am. Dec. 451.
